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Abstract 
This paper proposes a multidimensional index of regional and global orientation which can be 
used in confirmatory studies with econometric methodologies. Unlike extant measures, the index 
is objectively scaled and controls for home country orientation and market size differences. The 
index is shown to be consistent with models of internationalization that incorporate different 
assumptions about strategic choice and global competition. Preliminary results show that large 
multinationals follow home region oriented internationalization paths, although much of the 
regional effect reported by previous studies in fact reflects strong home country biases. 
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LOCAL, REGIONAL OR GLOBAL? QUANTIFYING MNC 
GEOGRAPHIC SCOPE 
 
The emerging literature on regional multinationals (Rugman and Hodgetts, 2001; Rugman and 
Verbeke, 2004; 2005; Rugman, 2005) has added renewed relevance to the debate on 
globalization. While extant theories of international strategy have taken their departure in the 
dichotomous local-global distinction (e.g. Prahalad and Doz, 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989), 
we know now that intermediate levels of geographical aggregation, in particular at the regional 
level, may be the dominant paradigm in many multinational corporations (MNCs). One of the 
key questions in this literature is whether the process of internationalization itself occurs along 
regional or global paths. A pioneering study of this was provided recently by Rugman and 
Verbeke (2004, henceforth “RV”) who used regional sales data to show that very few MNCs had 
a truly global sales dispersion, whereas a majority were oriented towards their home region. So, 
while adding an additional layer of complexity between the global (headquarter) level and the 
local (subsidiary) level, the regional approach clearly captures an important element of spatial 
coordination which is apparent in real-world firms, and casts serious doubt on the commonly 
accepted view that we are living in an ‘increasingly globalized world’. 
Even though the regional approach holds much promise, there have been few attempts to 
test a “theory of regional multinationals” against competing hypotheses in confirmatory analysis 
with econometric methodologies. This is not surprising, however, as there currently exist no 
methodology to set up such a test, due primarily to a lack of appropriate metrics to measure 
MNCs’ regional and global orientation in a consistent and objective way. A classification based 
on regional sales ratios may indeed be eye-opening, but it can never corroborate the theory of 
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regional multinationals, for several reasons. First, looking at regional sales ratios does not enable 
us to control for the effect of home country orientation, which influences measured home region 
sales. As such, regional sales data may indeed show that very few firms are global, but it cannot 
tell us if this is because they are regional, or because they are local: it is a simultaneous test of 
home country and home region orientation and therefore effectively a test of neither. Second, the 
result of a classification or segmentation is always sensitive to the choice of cut-off points 
(Sammartino and Osegowitsch, 2006). Finally, one may also question if the same classification 
criteria should be applied to firms from different countries and regions, as the extant metrics do 
not take into account the relative sizes of home and host economies. This makes it difficult to 
generalize the results across geographical contexts and to compare firms of different origins. On 
a more general level, the metrics of regionalization currently being used, while intuitive, are also 
quite detached from the theory of regional multinationals. As long as there are no theoretically 
derived measures, it is questionable if we can use regional orientation as a dependent or 
independent variable in large sample studies. 
To address these challenges, this paper extends the work of RV by proposing an index of 
regional and global market penetration. The main contribution of the index over the existing 
sales dispersion indices is that it incorporates into them an objective criterion of globalization: 
the criterion, suggested by Fisch and Oesterle (2003), that the sales distribution of a global firm 
must match the distribution of global GDP. For example, as the Swedish economy constitutes 
1% of global GDP and the US economy 29%, we should require both Swedish and US firms to 
have 1% of their sales in Sweden and 29% in the US, if these firms are to be called ‘global’1. In 
short, the implication of being globalized is that we cannot say anything about a firm’s 
                                                 
1 We could also use other benchmarking variables, e.g. GNI, PPP, private consumption, domestic demand, or – 
ideally – industry sales. This paper uses GDP throughout, but GNI and PPP were also tested with this framework, 
with similar results (all these macroeconomic variables are highly correlated). 
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geographic origins merely by looking at its sales. This paper extends this criterion to the regional 
dimension as well, asserting that the sales distribution of a regional firm must mirror the regional 
GDP distribution. It then combines the globalization and regionalization dimensions to arrive at a 
composite index of internationalization spanning local, regional, and global firms. This enables 
us to asses MNCs’ global orientation (whether they favor home or host region) independently of 
their degree of internationalization. Then, by presenting formal models of strategic choice and 
global competition – the index is derived from, and hence shown to be compatible with, different 
assumptions about the internationalization process of the MNC. Finally, the empirical evidence 
on regional strategies is reassessed, and implications for further research are highlighted. 
 
The Theory and Evidence of Regional Multinationals 
A central tenet in the studies of regional multinationals is that international expansion and cross-
border integration is more costly across regional blocks, e.g. between the US and Japan, than 
within them, e.g. between the US and Canada. There are two main arguments behind this 
(Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; 2005). First, environmental diversity is assumed to be higher when 
the MNC operates outside the home region than it is for countries within the home region, 
because the economic and institutional differences are larger across regional borders. For 
example, issues of language and cultural norms would make it easier for Spanish firms than for 
Japanese firms to enter the French market. Second, products, knowledge, people and capital flow 
more easily between countries within the same region than between regions. This is in part 
because of geographical proximity but also, and perhaps primarily, as a result of policy-driven 
regional integration within the EU, NAFTA, and ASEAN. 
 
 6
Liability of Foreignness and Regional Strategy 
While most studies of regionalism have emphasized empirics (with notable exceptions such as 
Rugman and Verbeke, 2005), they implicitly build on and extend the concept of liability of 
foreignness, which originates with the work of Hymer (1976). Hymer described the 
disadvantages faced by foreign firms when competing against purely national firms in their home 
market, such as the foreign firm’s lack of information about the host market, host market 
discrimination against outsiders, and exchange rate risk. Zaheer (1995) subsequently coined the 
term ‘liability of foreignness’ and tested the concept empirically by comparing the performance 
of locally- and foreign-owned financial trading rooms, finding that the former did indeed 
outperform the latter (Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowsky, 1997). 
Although not shown in these studies (each trading room was coded as being either 
foreign or local), the liability of foreignness is conceptualized as being caused in part by 
“cultural, political, and economic differences” (Zaheer, 1995: 341). In other words, the liability 
of foreignness should be seen not as a universal constant, but as related to the diversity and 
distance between the home and host country. In the context of regional theory, we therefore need 
to distinguish between the liability of foreignness inside and outside the MNC’s home region. As 
described by Rugman and Brain (2003: 7): “When MNEs have exhausted their growth 
opportunities in the home-triad and go into other regions, they then face a liability of foreignness 
and other additional risks by this expansion”. A priori one could interpret this statement in two 
ways: One is that the MNC encounters liability of foreignness only when it ventures outside its 
home region, because regional integration is sufficiently strong to allow firms the luxury of 
unconstrained internationalization within the home region. A weaker but maybe more realistic 
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assumption is that the liability of foreignness exists also in the home region (except of course in 
the home country), but that it is significantly higher outside it. 
Regardless of which interpretation we choose, the empirical implication is that MNCs’ 
international expansion should occur primarily within their home regions, and to a much lesser 
degree in other regions. On the macro-level, this proposition can be evaluated by export data 
(e.g. Rugman and Hodgetts, 2001). On the firm level, it can be assessed by the geographic 
dispersion of employees, assets, or sales. RV define a “global” firm as one having more than 
20% of its sales in each of the triad regions and no more than 50% in one single region, while the 
“home region oriented” firm has more than half of its sales in its home region. This leads them to 
classify 320 of the firms in their Fortune 500 sample as home region oriented and only 9 as 
global. The finding has been replicated within several sub-samples, e.g. Japanese companies 
(Collinson and Rugman, 2006) and multinational retailers (Rugman and Girod, 2003). 
 
Limitations of the RV Classification 
While these results may seem, prima facie, to be strong evidence in favor of regionalization, a 
closer look at the criteria used to distinguish between global and home region oriented firms 
illustrates some of the inherent intricacies of measuring regionalization and globalization.  
First, looking at the share of home region to total sales (henceforth denoted O/T), does 
not tell us how much of the measured regional sales bias of a given firm is explained by a lack of 
internationalization. Firm pursuing local strategies, with a very high share of their sales in their 
home countries, would also get high values of O/T and hence appear to be highly home-region 
oriented even though they were in fact constrained by national and not regional boundaries. To 
take an extreme example, consider a British firm that sells 55% of its output in the UK and 45% 
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in the US. This firm would be classified as home region oriented, even though it had no sales to 
European customers outside of the UK. To remedy this problem we could combine O/T with the 
share of foreign to total sales, F/T, which is also reported by RV. However, until now there is no 
guideline in the literature for how these two numbers should be compared or interpreted jointly. 
The index in this paper enables us to compute a “global orientation” score which controls for 
home country orientation. 
Second, we lack a theoretical justification of the cut-off points used to draw the line 
between regional and global firms. RV operationalize globalization as an ‘even sales 
distribution’ across the three triad regions. However, there are clearly degrees of evenness and 
the result would therefore seem to depend on the exact operationalization of the term (in RV it is 
set at 20% sales in each of the triad regions), just as the amount of firms with home region 
orientation is sensitive to the 50% criterion (Sammartino and Osegowitsch, 2006). This paper 
suggests an alternative approach, which is to measure the degree of globalization and 
regionalization against a theoretically derived absolute benchmark. This will tell us, in 
percentage terms, how close MNCs are to the ideal of globalization and is therefore better for 
comparative purposes. 
Finally, both F/T and O/T are sensitive to the size of the home economy, and as such it is 
not obvious how we can compare them across different countries and regions. For example, does 
globalization mean the same for a Swedish and a US firm? Consider two global firms with the 
same geographical sales dispersion corresponding to the distribution of world GDP. One firm is 
from the US where 29% of the world’s GDP is generated, and one from Sweden where only 1% 
is generated. Using F/T to measure the internationalization of these two firms would assign 99% 
to the Swedish firm and only 71% to the US firm. Hence we would arrive at the erroneous 
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conclusion that the Swedish firm was more global than the US firm, even though they had the 
exact same global sales distribution. In general, any F/T comparison would almost inevitably 
lead us to the conclusion that Swedish firms are more internationalized than US firms are, but 
one may question if this is a meaningful statement, or if it is merely a result of the way that our 
internationalization measure is defined. A similar objection can be applied against the use of O/T 
as a regionalization measure. By controlling for the size of the home country and region, the 
index proposed in this paper lends itself more easily to cross-country and cross-region 
comparisons. 
 
Two Dimensions of Globalization 
When we combine the GDP criterion of globalization with the notion of liability of foreignness, 
it seems natural to assume that a given firm may deviate from a global sales distribution 
primarily in two ways. First, a firm’s foreign sales within its home region may be low compared 
to the intra-regional GDP distribution between the home country and the rest of the region. Such 
a firm can be said to be imperfectly intra-regionalized, in the sense that it has not yet fully 
penetrated the markets within its home region. For example, the UK constitutes 17% of 
European GDP, so a fully intra-regionalized UK firm should derive 83% of its European 
revenues outside the UK. Second, a firm’s foreign sales outside its home region may be lower 
(relative to the home country) than the global GDP distribution suggests. If this is the case, the 
firm is not fully inter-regionalized. For example, as 5% of world GDP is in the UK and 68% is 
outside Europe, the non-European revenues of a fully inter-regionalized British firm should be 
approximately 14 (=68/5) times as large as its UK revenues. 
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To show this more generally, assume that the firm’s sales can be segmented into three 
geographic areas: (1) home country sales denoted H; (2) sales in the rest of the home region (i.e. 
total home region sales minus home country sales) denoted E; and (3) sales in the rest of the 
world denoted W. The firm’s global revenue is given by T=H+E+W. From these numbers we can 
calculate sales ratios: h=H/T, e=E/T, and w=W/T, with h+e+w=12. We will compare these ratios 
to similarly defined GDP ratios, denoted hI, eI, and wI, where hI is the GDP of the home country 
as a share of global GDP, eI is the GDP share of rest of the home region and wI that of the rest of 
the world.  
If the firm had no nationality – and therefore encountered no liability of foreignness – it 
could take full advantage of demand in any country in the world. This (admittedly highly 
hypothetical) MNC is akin to the perfectly globalized firm described earlier, with a sales 
distribution corresponding to the global GDP distribution. In the notation used here, the global 
firm would have h=hI, e=eI, and w=wI (⇔ H=hIT, E=eIT, and W=wIT). However, due to the 
imperfect nature of international expansion, a given firm’s observed sales outside the home 
country are likely to be lower than this ideal. This could for example be written as E=ReIT and 
W=GwIT. The scaling constant R is then the firm’s intra-regionalization, defined as its relative 
sales penetration of other home region countries, compared to the global firm. Similarly, the 
scaling constant G is the degree of inter-regionalization, reflecting the relative sales penetration 
outside the home region. As we will see, these two values can be derived from a three-way 
segmentation of GDP and firm sales. 
A high degree of liability of foreignness leads to low values of R and G (presumably 
below 1) as it prevents the firm from realizing its foreign sales potential. In the extreme, if the 
                                                 
2 The relative sales ratios can be calculated directly from the F/T and O/T values reported by RV: h=1-F/T, e=O/T-h, 
and w=1-h-e. 
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cost of operating abroad were prohibitive, we would get R=G=0 and hence no sales outside the 
firm’s home country at all. On the other hand, the perfectly globalized firm incurs no foreign 
penalty and is a special case with R=G=1. To capture this inverse relationship between liability 
of foreignness (denoted L) and market penetration, let R=1-Le and G=1-Lw, where Le and Lw are 
the liability of foreignness in home and host regions, respectively3. If L is higher in host region 
markets than it is in the home region, we should, ceteris paribus, observe R>G. A comparison of 
R and G is therefore an indirect assessment of the difference in liability of foreignness: it reveals 
the home region effect implied by the firm’s sales distribution. Indeed, this is why R and G have 
more theoretical content than the traditional F/T and O/T measures and can be used for 
hypothesis testing. 
 
Calculating the Metrics 
By definition, the MNC’s host market sales ratios e and w are the sales in each host area divided 
by the total sales: 
 
TGwTReTh
TGw
WEH
Ww
TGwTReTh
TRe
WEH
Ee
III
I
III
I
++=++≡
++=++≡
 [1] 
 
Solving for the implied values of the two globalization metrics yields: 
 
                                                 
3 Other functional forms of this relationship (e.g. exponentional) could also be used, as long as (R-G) and (Lw-Le) 
has the same sign, and that 01 =⇔= eLR  and 10 =⇔= eLR  (and similarly for G and Lw). If these 
condition are fulfilled all conclusions in this paper are robust to the functional form. 
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These expressions have an intuitive interpretation. Intra-regionalization is increasing in the 
foreign-to-home country sales ratio within the home region (e/h), and inter-regionalization is 
increasing in the foreign-to-home country sales ratio outside the home region (w/h). 
Alternatively, R and G can be seen as measures of the MNC’s market penetration in each host 
location relative to its market penetration in the home country. In absolute terms, denote global 
GDP by TI and area GDP by HI=hITI, EI=eITI, and WI=wITI. The MNC’s share of GDP in each 
host area is then given by: 
 
II
II
H
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E
=
=
 [3] 
 
Hence, a fully globalized firm (R=G=1) has an identical share (=H/HI) of GDP in every location 
in the world, whereas a less globalized firm has lower shares of GDP in host economies than it 
does in its home economy. Note that a firm can potentially have values of R and G above 1, if it 
has a higher share of GDP in some host countries than it does at home. From a theoretical 
viewpoint this type of ‘overglobalization’ should be unusual (since it would imply a negative 
liability of foreignness), but ultimately that is an empirical question.  
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The Global Orientation of the Firm 
By incorporating the GDP criterion, the methodology outlined here solves some of the 
aforementioned limitations of the “raw” F/T and O/T measures. First, as intra- and inter-
regionalization are similarly defined and scaled, we can actually compare them in order to assess 
the global orientation of the firm, unlike any absolute measures like F/T and O/T. Second, it 
relieves us from the reliance on cut-off points for determining when firms are global, regional or 
national, allowing us instead to measure, more realistically, the degree to which firms are intra- 
and inter-regionalized in percentage terms. Finally, the use of global GDP as a reference point 
solves the problem of the sensitivity to the size of the home country or region. A firm with a 
sales distribution corresponding to world GDP is will be seen as 100% intra- and inter-
regionalized, regardless of its country of origin. 
Figure 1 plots the two dimensions against one another and shows some hypothetical cases 
in the four corners of the grid.  
 
*** Figure 1 About Here *** 
 
The simplest case is the national firm, which derives all its sales within its home country. The 
opposite corner of the figure contains the global firm, which has fully internationalized both 
within its home region and outside it. In the remaining two quadrants we have firms that are 
internationalized along one dimension but not along the other. The regional firm is completely 
intra-regionalized, as it has the required foreign sales in its home region, but no sales outside it. 
The host-regional firm, conversely, has skipped its home region entirely in its 
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internationalization process, but its distribution between home country and host region markets 
corresponds to the GDP distribution.  
By definition, large home country sales will lead to low values of R, which therefore 
simultaneously captures aspects of the regional orientation and the degree of internationalization 
of the firm. Because of this we cannot use R alone to judge whether MNCs pursue regional or 
global strategies; it is the relative value of R and G that tells us something about the importance 
of regional borders. In Figure 1, the further below the diagonal we are, the higher is the firm’s 
share of EI compared to its share of WI (cf. Equation [3]). Therefore, to obtain a measure of 
‘global orientation’ which controls for home country orientation, we define: 
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The global orientation score of a firm is simply the ratio of G and R: if the firm is more 
successful intra-regionally than it is inter-regionally, it can be said to be home region oriented 
and will get a Z-value below 1. These are the firms we would expect to see in industries with 
effective regional market integration on the one hand and strong globalization barriers on the 
other. The second expression shows that Z implies the relative liability of foreignness in host and 
home regions. If Z<1, the firm is assumed to be oriented towards its home region precisely 
because the cost of doing business outside the home region is larger than in more proximate 
countries. If the liability of foreignness is the same in all host countries globally, on the other 
hand, we will get Z=1. Such a firm can be said to follow a balanced, i.e. region-agnostic, 
internationalization path where close and proximate foreign markets are emphasized equally. 
Finally, MNCs with Z>1 are host-region oriented, in the sense that their intra-regional market 
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penetration is lower than their inter-regional market penetration. RV identify a small group of 
host region oriented MNCs, which are almost exclusively European or Asian firms with a high 
share of sales in North America. Presumably this can be explained by the strategic importance of 
the US market in certain industries. All in all, a test of whether and how Z differs from unity is a 
test of the regional effect: whether MNCs are more, less or equally successful in terms of sales in 
their home regions than they are in other regions4.  
Each value of Z corresponds to an international expansion path, symbolized by the arrows 
from the origin in Figure 1. A firm of a particular global orientation may be more or less 
internationalized depending on how far it has moved along this path. Hence Z captures the 
composition of foreign sales, controlling for the degree of internationalization. Let us define the 
degree of internationalization similarly to R and G, as  
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Defined like this, I is just a GDP-weighted average of R and G. Figure 2 plots 
internationalization against global orientation. Thus, these two measures can be considered 
orthogonal variables which in combination produce the same MNC taxonomy as shown 
previously5. 
 
*** Figure 2 About Here *** 
                                                 
4 Note that the two last expressions in Equation [4] are intuitively similar to the ones describing R and G. They tell 
us that the firm is globally oriented if and only if the home region share of the foreign sales corresponds to the GDP 
distribution or, correspondingly, if the MNC’s share of GDP is the same in both home and host regions. 
5 Note that regional and host-regional firms have I<1, as they are fully internationalized only along one of the two 
dimensions. 
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A Strategic Choice Model 
In the simple model described above, the MNC generates sales “automatically” in proportion to 
(1-L) in each market. In that sense, the geographic scope of the firm is determined exogenously 
and the managerial implications of the model are therefore not obvious. In the real world, 
managers do have some discretion as to the geographic scope of the firm, by choosing the level 
of investments in the different countries and regions where they operate. The strategic choice 
model, described in this section, incorporates that assumption in order to represent R and G as 
outcomes of managerial decisions. 
In this model, the MNC determines how much sales it wants in each area as a fraction of 
that area’s GDP, and then pays the costs of the investments needed to obtain these sales targets. 
The managers thus set the choice variables ah, ae, and aw, which are the target GDP shares (sales 
as a fraction of GDP) for the home country, home region, and host regions, respectively. This 
results in sales of ihHaH = , ieEaE = , and iwWaW =  in the three areas. Hence, the choice 
variables in this model are not absolute investment levels, but scaled so that a=0.001 corresponds 
to obtaining sales of 0.1% of GDP in a geographic area, a=0.002 results in 0.2% of GDP, and so 
forth. It is assumed that the equilibrium shares of GDP are in any case negligible, so that the total 
size of the world economy Ti can be considered exogenous (not affected measurably by the 
firm’s choice6).  
 Of course, to obtain these sales numbers the MNC needs to undertake real investments. 
These could be a combination of FDI in the target countries, and expenditures on marketing and 
                                                 
6 This assumption is probably realistic for all but the very largest MNCs. The largest firm in the data set, Wal-Mart, 
has about 1.5% of US GDP and 0.5% of world GDP, whereas the average Fortune 500 MNC only has 0.07% of 
world GDP. 
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export capacity made in other countries, directed towards the target country. The costs of these 
investments are 2hiacH , )1/(
2
eei LacE − , and )1/(2 wwi LacW −  for the three areas. These 
expenditure functions require some explanation: The parameter c captures the overall cost of 
obtaining GDP share. The target shares a are squared to reflect diminishing returns or, 
equivalently, increasing marginal costs of attaining incremental GDP share points, as demand 
becomes saturated. Furthermore, the cost of investment is proportional to the size of the market 
that the MNC is attempting to capture, and therefore the cost of investment in each area is 
multiplied by the size of that area’s economy. For example, getting a 0.1% share of the Chinese 
market would require much higher investment expenditure than getting a 0.1% share of the 
Danish market. Finally, because of the liability of foreignness, it is more costly to obtain a 
certain GDP share outside the home country than it is within it. Therefore, the investment cost in 
each region is divided by 1-L (where L=0 in the home country). If L goes towards 0 there is no 
penalty, and if L goes towards 1 the costs of investment for any positive target GDP share 
approaches infinity and the firm will therefore not capture any part of that market, as was the 
case in the previous models. 
To complete the model, the firm earns a margin of m on each dollar of sales in any 
market, and it has a fixed cost of C. The total profit function is then: 
 
CLacWLacEacHWmaEmaHma wwieeihiiwieih −−−−−−++= )1/()1/( 222π  [6] 
 
Solution to the Model 
The following first-order conditions require the firm to equate marginal benefits and marginal 
costs of GDP share in each of its three markets: 
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These show us that the firm chooses a lower share of GDP in its host markets than it does in its 
home country, like in the simple model, with the chosen share being proportional to (1-L). The 
dollar amount invested in each area can be found by inserting the optimal a-values into the 
investment expenditure functions, resulting in investments of icm H4
2 , ( ) iecm EL−14 2 , and 
( ) iwcm WL−14 2  in the three areas. This implies that the MNC should invest proportionally to the 
size of the economy in each area, while reducing its investments accordingly in areas where it 
encounters a liability of foreignness. 
Finally, with some manipulations (inserting the optimal a-values in the sales functions, 
deriving relative sales in the three areas, and solving for the liability of foreignness) we arrive at 
the result: 
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In other words, the measures of intra- and inter-regionalization developed previously are 
consistent with a model in which the MNC is allowed to choose its geographic scope. Since the 
MNC’s optimal choice is determined by the liability of foreignness – which affects the marginal 
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cost of attaining GDP share in a given area – the observed average values of R and G can be seen 
as estimators of that liability. The difference is that in this model, (1-L) is not the actual but the 
optimal value of R and G, so bounded rationality in the scope decision may lead some managers 
to choose too high or low values of these variables. The implications of this will be discussed in 
the conclusion. 
 
A Competitive Model 
As described in the literature review, the liability of foreignness is often conceptualized as a 
performance penalty suffered by the MNC in a host market relative to local competitors (Hymer, 
1976; Zaheer, 1995). The models presented so far are limited by their lack of explicit recognition 
of this. This section therefore incorporates competitive aspects into the analysis by presenting a 
model of regional and global competition. 
 For convenience, suppose that the world consists of two regions of each two countries7, 
and that one firm from each country compete in a global industry. In a given country, all four 
competitors are present but with different effect: the foreign companies suffer a liability of 
foreignness which inhibits their ability to maintain market share, so their competitiveness in host 
markets is only (1-L) that of the local firms. When all four firms compete in a given country, 
their relative competitiveness determines who get the lion’s share of the market. To capture this 
idea, the market share of each firm in this model is its own net competitiveness divided by the 
combined net competitiveness of all the firms in that market. Finally, assume that the industry 
constitutes a fraction x of the overall economy in all countries. This leads to the following sales 
functions for a given firm: 
                                                 
7 The model can easily be generalized to more regions and countries. Also, the results are identical if N rather than 
one firm from each country compete in the market. 
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Deriving the relative sales ratios h, e, and w from these sales functions, and solving for the 
liability of foreignness, gives us the familiar results: 
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Hence, the introduction of competition does not invalidate the two measures: they can still be 
considered as estimators of the liability of foreignness in host markets. 
 
Hypotheses 
To sum up, all three models presented above share the idea that the observed values of R and G 
should be related to the liability of foreignness. Hence, the theory of regional multinationals has 
at least one clear implication which can be evaluated with these metrics. If regional borders 
constrain internationalization, we should observe MNCs following home region oriented 
internationalization paths, and hence on average that Z<1. This would be an indication that the 
average sales penetration of foreign markets within the home region is higher than that of host 
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region markets. This can be called the “weak form” of the regional hypothesis as it merely 
assumes that the liability of foreignness is lower in the home region than outside it. 
 
Hypothesis W: Large MNCs are home region oriented. 
 
However, if MNCs are regional in a more pure sense, we should expect them to completely 
overcome the liability of foreignness in their home region and obtain R=1 (while still having 
G<1; otherwise they would be global). This can be called the “strong form” of the regional 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis S: Large MNCs are regional. 
 
A Reassessment of the RV Evidence 
To test these hypotheses, the RV database (consisting of the global Fortune 500 as of 2001) was 
recompiled to generate the metrics defined here. For a description of the data set, see the original 
RV paper or Rugman, 2005. Due to lack of data, 355 observations were discarded for a sample 
of 145 firms, 29% of the Global Fortune 500 and 38% of the RV data set. Of these 145 firms, 24 
were not MNCs as they had no foreign sales (primarily US retail chains), so the final sample 
contained 121 firms. 
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Results 
The correlation between R and G is only 0.34, statistically different from unity, which indicates 
good discriminant validity. Table 2 reports the values of the four metrics. Figure 3 plots R 
against G and Figure 4 I against Z. 
 
*** Table 1 About Here *** 
 
*** Figure 3 About Here *** 
 
*** Figure 4 About Here *** 
 
The table shows that the average value8 of Z for the entire sample is 0.63. The high t-values for 
all regions show that this is significantly lower than 1 and lead us to confirm the regional 
hypothesis in its weak form: large MNCs do indeed follow home region oriented 
internationalization paths. However, they are clearly not very far along these paths, being on 
average only 30% intra-regionalized (and only 13% internationalized in general), so the 
importance of the home country market clearly has not been eliminated by regional integration. 
Indeed, the high t-values for R show that it is significantly lower than 1, refuting the regional 
hypothesis in its strong form. 
Figure 3 conveys a similar message, as the firms cluster below the diagonal and most of 
them are close to the origin. The average global orientation of the firms is shown with an arrow. 
A few firms are fully or overly regionalized with R>1 and are therefore not shown in Figure 3. 
                                                 
8 Weighting by the MNC’s degree of internationalization gives a slightly higher, but still significantly different from 
1, Z-average. 
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One additional firm, GlaxoSmithKline from the UK, is truly internationalized along both 
dimensions, with R=1.12 and G=1.27. In Figure 4 we can also see the majority of the firms in the 
bottom-left quadrant where the degree of both internationalization and global orientation is low. 
 In general, the North American firms are the most the home region oriented, with 
penetration of regional markets at 72%, and many of them are very close to being pure regional 
firms. In comparison, they have an inter-regional penetration of only 11%. This challenges the 
conventional wisdom that US firms dominate the global marketplace: in fact, the European 
MNCs in this data set are just as inter-regionalized as the American ones are. The Asian firms 
are generally less internationalized than companies in the two other triad regions, with low 
values of R, and very low values of G. 
 
Conclusion and Implications 
The measurement approach outlined in this paper combines intra- and extra-regional sales 
expansion in an orthogonal index with objective reference points. Some preliminary evidence 
from large multinationals suggests that these two dimensions are well suited to capture the 
richness and complexity of actual firms’ internationalization paths. Thus, the regional aspect may 
provide a new manifestation of the multidimensional nature of internationalization (Ramaswamy 
et al, 1996). Most importantly, it shows us – with statistical confidence – that the theory of 
regional multinationals is compatible with the data: to the extent that they do internationalize, 
large MNCs clearly do so along home region oriented paths. Yet their degree of 
internationalization along these paths is surprisingly low, implying that much of the regional 
effect reported by RV is in fact a home country effect. In that sense, large MNCs are neither 
purely global nor purely regional, but rather home region oriented with strong national biases. 
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This tells us that regional integration may be less effective than previously believed, and that 
significant barriers to international expansion remain also within regions. Finally, the data 
showed a significant regional difference: North American firms were the most regional in their 
orientation, whereas Asian firms were the least internationalized in general.  
 Of course, these empirical findings are neither conclusive nor exhaustive of the potential 
uses of the index. Many observations were deleted due to missing data (for instance, supposedly 
global firms such as Coca-Cola and IBM), which could influence the results. Furthermore, these 
data do not tell us if regional firms are more or less successful than global firms. Hence, even if 
we can see that large MNCs are home region oriented, we cannot say if this is because it is the 
best strategy to be so, or merely because of cognitive biases. Note however that the performance 
ramifications of the models in this paper are more complex than the argument found in the extant 
literature. Whereas Rugman and Hodgetts (2001) argue simply that regional firms will perform 
better than global firms, the strategic choice model implies that there is an optimal degree of 
global orientation. Therefore, if firms on average choose the optimal strategy, we should be able 
to observe no linear relationship (although possibly a curvilinear one) between geographic scope 
and performance. Only if the typical MNC overestimates the optimal degree of global 
orientation, for example due to the emphasis on globalization in the media, should we find a 
negative relationship between global orientation and performance. 
 The theory of regional strategy presented in this paper is highly stylized and could be 
made more realistic by relaxing some of its assumptions. Ultimately, however, it is neither the 
data nor the theory in isolation which is important, but the combination and not least the 
alignment of the two. This paper aims to further that alignment within the research on regional 
multinationals, by introducing theory-based measures, and the formal models in the paper should 
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be seen as means to that end rather than as attempts at characterizing the complexities of the 
internationalization process. The models result in metrics that are easy to apply, have intuitive 
content, and can be used in a range of different types of empirical studies. For example, one 
could undertake performance studies with (R, G) or (I, Z) as independent variables to see 
whether the regional aspect holds more explanatory power than one-dimensional measures of 
multinationality. Also, measuring these variables in longitudinal settings may allow us to assess 
the dynamics and convergence/divergence of regional and global integration. The ability to 
perform these and other types of studies with consolidated samples spanning several countries is 
an important benefit of the proposed index. 
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Figure 1 – Internationalization Paths and Profiles 
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Figure 2 – Internationalization Paths and Profiles 
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Figure 3 – Intra- and Inter-Regionalization of Large Multinationals 
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Figure 4 – Internationalization and Global Orientation of Large Multinationals 
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Table 1 – Regional Patterns of Internationalization 
Region N R G I Z t (R<1) t (Z<1)
Europe 75 0.19 0.11 0.13 0.68 42.3** 3.2** 
Asia-Pacific 27 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.57 44.1** 2.5** 
North America 19 0.72 0.11 0.14 0.27 7.1** 9.4** 
Total Sample 121 0.30 0.10 0.13 0.63 21.0** 4.5** 
* Significant at p<0.05 
** Significant at p<0.01 
 SMG – Working Papers 
www.cbs.dk/smg 
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